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Executive summary
The collaborative economy matches people online who want to share assets and ser-
vices. This Policy Contribution: i) discusses how the collaborative economy can be defined; 
ii) provides an overview of evidence about its potential benefits for European economies and 
the impact of specific platforms in the sectors of their operation; iii) illustrates the criteria that 
enable professional and non-professional services offered through collaborative platforms 
to be distinguished; iv) recommends priorities for the platforms so that they can create a safe 
and transparent environment for the transactions of their users; v) discusses further regulato-
ry concerns and how they should be approached.
The collaborative economy is characterised by a great variety of business models. It 
spans multiple sectors each of which has its own market characteristics. A single definition is 
therefore beyond reach. However, a common element in the majority of business models is 
the use of under-utilised assets for the extraction of economic benefits.
There is evidence that Europe could enjoy major economic gains from the collaborative 
economy, especially if barriers are removed and the regulatory framework is adjusted to 
better accommodate platforms. However, in particular sectors such as ride-sharing and short-
term accommodation, the benefits from the operation of platforms come at a cost because 
platforms can have a detrimental effect on ‘traditional’ incumbent operators. The technology 
is thus disruptive to many traditional businesses.
While, under EU legislation, it is not clear when services supplied through collaborative 
platforms can be classified as professional, a careful examination of business models on a 
case-by-case basis can help to define some relevant criteria. The frequency with which a ser-
vice is provided, the provider’s motive and the associated remuneration are three important 
aspects that enable professional and non-professional services  to be distinguished.
As intermediaries, collaborative platforms have access to a large volume of informa-
tion about the market and about their users, which is not available to other market partici-
pants or the regulator. Consumer protection requires a safe and transparent environment for 
transactions. Platforms based on their market position could be very helpful with this respect. 
Legal certainty and regulatory clarity are also required to incentivise further investment 
in efficient information technologies and platforms. The current uncertainty over the status 
of the collaborative economy platforms, legal disputes in national and European courts and 
decisions to restrict the operation of platforms at local/city levels create an environment 
in which it is difficult to attract new investment in Europe. Regulatory authorities should 
move quickly to define the framework of the operation of such platforms to restore investors’ 
confidence. Local regulation is very important for defining the operational framework of col-
laborative platforms that can bring the greatest benefits to local economies. But an EU-wide 
approach is also needed to define the general framework of the operation of these platforms 
and to address in a decisive and clear way the associated regulatory concerns.
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1 Introduction
The collaborative economy uses the internet to match people who want to share assets and 
services. Rather than buying a power drill that I only need for 15 minutes, for example, I can 
rent an idle one from someone else. A collaborative economy platform can help to identify 
who is willing to offer their power drill and to initiate the transaction. If the consumer has a 
preference for a drill with particular technical characteristics, it will be beneficial for her to be 
directed to the provider who offers that particular drill. Platforms can provide such recom-
mendations and therefore facilitate efficient transactions through their matching algorithms. 
Users can maximise the value generated from their under-utilised assets, contributing to the 
better allocation of resources.
However, the collaborative economy also presents regulatory challenges. For example, 
competition between collaborative platforms and ‘traditional’ firms, which are subject to 
more restrictive rules, raises questions about how the level playing field can be restored. 
Because of their position in the market, platforms can also provide helpful services in terms of 
ensuring a safe and transparent environment that sufficiently protects their users. 
This Policy Contribution provides an overview of definitions of collaborative economy 
(section 2), identifies the key elements in the business models of platforms which allow us to 
distinguish between when the provision of a service is professional and when it is not (section 
3) and offers nine tentative recommendations to improve users’ experience of participation in 
collaborative economy platforms (section 4).
2 Definitions, business models and the 
impact of the collaborative economy
KEY FINDINGS
• Given the great variety and diversity of collaborative business models, it is difficult to 
provide a single definition; 
• Many collaborative economy business models rely on the exploitation of under-utilised 
assets;
• Categorisation of collaborative platforms refers to whether they are for-profit or not, and 
whether they facilitate business-to-consumer or peer-to-peer transactions;
• Collaborative platforms could generate multi-billion euro gains for the European econo-
my;
• Available empirical evidence shows that the market entry of platforms like Airbnb and 
Uber has had detrimental effects on the hotel and taxi industries, respectively. However, 
positive spillover effects may also be significant;
• Based on current findings, the entry of collaborative platforms is very likely to generate 
net benefits for consumers.
2.1 How to define the collaborative economy?
Terms such as ‘collaborative economy’, ‘sharing economy’, ‘gig economy’, ‘on-demand 
economy’ and ‘peer economy’ are often used interchangeably. The variety of names mirrors 
the confusion that surrounds this concept. Frenken et al (2015) defined the collaborative 
economy as the economy in which consumers grant other consumers temporary access to 
under-utilised assets (possibly for money). Maselli et al (2016) expanded this definition in 
two ways. First, they discarded the temporary access aspect by considering all goods that are 
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shared among consumers in a second-hand economy. Second, they take into account the 
provision of services from one consumer to another via contests or auctions, instead of only 
counting the trade in under-utilised assets.
Botsman (2015) defines the collaborative economy as “an economic system of decentralised 
networks and marketplaces that unlocks the value of underused assets by matching needs and 
haves, in ways that bypass traditional middlemen”. This economic system has three broad 
characteristics (Botsman and Roger, 2010): 
• Access to products or services without the need to own the underlying assets; 
• Re-allocation of goods; 
• Exchange of intangible assets.  
Botsman (2015) also identifies five key criteria for a platform to be considered a collabora-
tive economy platform:
1. The core business idea involves unlocking the value of unused or under-utilised assets 
whether for monetary or non-monetary benefits;
2. The company should have a clear values-driven mission and be built on meaningful 
principles including transparency and authenticity, which inform short and long-term 
strategic decisions;
3. The providers on the supply side should be valued, respected and empowered, and the 
companies behind the platforms should be committed to making the lives of these provid-
ers economically and socially better.
4. The customers on the demand side should benefit from being able to access goods and 
services in more efficient ways, with payment for access instead of ownership.
5. The business should be built on distributed marketplaces or decentralised networks that 
create a sense of community, collective accountability and mutual benefit.
Multiple other studies1 provide alternative definitions. Codagnone et al (2016), in their 
careful and comprehensive review of the literature, critically assess the main differences 
between these definitions. These include: a) the ability to facilitate exchange between 
strangers rather than within a community; b) strong reliance on technology that might also 
favour offline activities; and c) participation of consumers with high cultural capital rather 
than being limited to being a survival mechanism for the most disadvantaged.
Notwithstanding the multiple definitions, we can say that a key characteristic of the col-
laborative economy is that it provides an economic opportunity for individuals to trade their 
under-utilised assets with other individuals through intermediaries that match supply and 
demand in an efficient way, and with the help of information technologies. In many cases, 
this opportunity is only provided through collaborative platforms, as the supply of goods and 
services through other channels is subject to licencing and other regulatory barriers.   
2.2 Business models and sectors
The main participants in the collaborative economy are:
• Service providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills. They can be either pri-
vate individuals offering services on an occasional basis (‘peers’) or professional services 
providers;
• Users who consume the provided assets;
• Intermediaries that connect providers with consumers via collaborative platforms, and 
that might also facilitate payments from consumer to provider, and other transactions.
1 Dubois et al (2014); Schor (2014), (2015); Schor and Fitzmaurice (2015); Schor et al (2014). 
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Transactions generally do not lead to a change of ownership. By using information 
technologies, intermediaries can capture the underlying preferences and characteristics of 
potential providers and users and match supply and demand of assets in an efficient way. 
Intermediaries typically charge fees in the form of a percentage of the value of the transaction.
Use of technology to provide valuable information about the quality of products and ser-
vices can be very beneficial for the economy. Akerlof (1970) showed how the quality of goods 
traded in a market can degrade if buyers and sellers do not have equal access to information. 
If a buyer is unable to distinguish between a high-quality and a low-quality car, he or she 
will only be prepared to pay a fixed price for a car that averages the value of both. But sellers 
know the exact quality of the car they hold (private information). Given the fixed price at 
which buyers will buy, sellers will sell only when they hold a low-quality car, and will leave 
the market when they hold a high-quality car. Eventually, the average willingness-to-pay of 
buyers will decrease because the average quality of cars on the market will decrease, leading 
even more sellers of high-quality cars to leave the market. It is possible that this will lead 
to a market failure in which no trade takes places because there are only low-quality cars 
available. Intermediaries that signal the quality of goods and services and remove barriers to 
the sharing of information can therefore reduce the risk of market failure and enable more 
efficient transactions. 
The four sectors in which collaborative economy platforms have the most significant 
presence are:
1. Accommodation: through platforms, people rent out properties or parts of properties. 
Examples of such companies are: Airbnb, HomeAway, HouseTrip, 9Flats, Wimdu, One-
finestay, Roomerama, Sleepout, Love Home Swap and Holiday Lettings. Airbnb provides 
a residential space-rental platform matching hosts and guests. As of February 2016, it 
claimed a presence in 34,000 cities covering more than 190 countries, 2 million listings, 
and more than 60 million guests hosted. Airbnb is valued at $10 billion2. HomeAway, 
with a similar business model covers 190 countries. It is a public company valued at $3.4 
billion. 9Flats has a strong European presence with 100,000 listings.
2. Transportation: two different broad categories of platform can be distinguished in this 
sector. The first group of platforms facilitate the hiring of assets such as cars, motorbikes 
and bicycles. Examples are ZipCar, EasyCar, car2go, Autolib and Velib. The second group 
of platforms help their users to rent assets together with labour and human capital. Exam-
ples include BlaBlaCar, Sidecar, Uber and Lyft. Car2go offers transportation on demand 
using ‘by-the-minute’ rates. It is present in 29 European and North American cities. It 
reports having 1,000,000 members. BlaBlaCar enables drivers with empty seats and paying 
passengers to share long-distance travel costs; as of February 2016 the platform reports 
25 million members and 10 million travellers per quarter. It is a private company valued 
at $1.6 billion. Uber matches individuals that needing a lift with drivers; it has 160,000 
registered drivers and covers 230 cities in 58 countries. Its estimated revenues in 2014 
were between $1.5-2 billion (Codagnone et al, 2016). It is currently valued at $41.2 billion 
(Austin et al, 2015). Uber’s competitor, Lyft, has 60,000 registered drivers and is valued at 
$2.5 billion.
3. Online labour markets such as Amazon Mechanical Tusk, Adtriboo, TaskRabbit, Oltret-
ata, Freelancer, Crowdsource, Crowdflower and Clickworker. These platforms specialise in 
micro-tasking by matching employers and on demand workers. 
4. Finance: Crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and IndieGogo match entrepre-
neurial projects with funders (venture capital financing). Peer-to-peer lending plat-
forms such as Lending Club and Prosper connect individuals and SMEs with potential 
peer-lenders, without the involvement of any financial institution.
2 See VB Profiles & Crowd Companies (2015) for the market valuations of the collaborative platforms reported here.  
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Moreover, online marketplaces such as eBay, Amazon and Etsy act as intermediaries in 
consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer relationships in which the main purpose 
is the sale of goods.
Because of the variety that is characteristic of the collaborative economy, a single defini-
tion and taxonomy is beyond reach. However, Codagnone and Martens (2016) provide a good 
conceptual framework to map the collaborative economy (Figure 1). 
This classifies sharing platforms into for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit activities (NFP), 
which is a proxy for ‘true sharing’, and into business-to-consumer (B2C) and peer-to-peer 
(P2P) categories. Many P2P platforms are owned and operated by companies, but the primary 
service producers are individuals who are not formally organised as companies. 
Figure 1 shows a four-way split of the collaborative economy. The north-west quadrant 
of Figure 1 corresponds to platforms with true sharing motives. The south-east quadrant 
connects the collaborative economy to ordinary B2C online activities. The north-east quad-
rant corresponds to collaborative economy platforms that facilitate transactions between 
peers. Platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit and Upwork belong to this category. They 
have large user bases, raise short-term regulatory concerns and the largest players disrupt 
‘traditional’ incumbent industries. The south-west quadrant is empty as businesses have by 
definition a profit motive.
Figure 1: Classification matrix of collaborative economy platforms
Source: Codagnone and Martens (2016).   
2.3 Generated value and empirical findings
Geron (2013) estimated that the revenue flowing through the collaborative economy directly 
into people’s wallets at $3.5 billion, and the value of the collaborative economy in the EU at 
€20 billion. Vaughan and Hawksworth (2014) calculated that on a global basis the collab-
orative economy was worth $15 billion and could reach $335 billion by 2025. Barbezieux 
and Herody (2016) estimated that in France, collaborative economy activities turn over $2.5 
billion, involve about 15,000 firms (including self-employed micro-entrepreneurs), and 
generate 13,000 permanent jobs. This would amount to approximately 0.1 percent of French 
GDP generated by 0.5 percent of French companies for 0.05 percent of French total employ-
(1)
True ‘sharing’
(2)
Commercial P2P 
‘sharing’
(3) 
‘Empty set’
(4) 
Commercial B2C
P2P
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ment. Goudin (2016) approximated the potential economic gain from better use of capacities 
as a result of the collaborative economy to be €572 billion in annual consumption across in 
the EU if substantial associated regulatory barriers are removed. Such barriers could reduce 
the value of potential increased use by up to €18 billion in the shorter term and by up to €134 
billion in the medium and longer term, depending on the scale of the obstacles. Most of these 
estimates, however, should be treated with caution as, because of the lack of reliable data 
and consolidated empirical evidence, they are inevitably based on questionable assumptions 
(Codagnone et al, 2016). 
Owyang et al (2014) in their survey of the UK, US and Canada, found that 29 percent of 
the British population had engaged at least once in a sharing transaction and 23 percent had 
used one or more platforms such as Airbnb, Uber, TaskRabbit, Etsy and Kickstarter. Stokes et 
al (2014) estimated that in 2014, 25 percent of the UK adult population shared online in some 
way. Huws and Joyce (2016b) using a nationally-representative sample of the UK popula-
tion aged 16-75 and conducted at the end of 2015, reported that 72 percent of respondents 
were either making an income from online activities or buying labour from others. Of these, 
around 1 percent was involved in online rental schemes such as Airbnb. Huws and Joyce 
(2016a) found that about 68 percent of the Swedish adult population is active in some way in 
the online economy, for instance selling goods online or renting out rooms on platforms like 
Airbnb (those involved only in online rental are around 1 percent in Sweden as well). Van 
de Glind (2013) provided a large representative survey of Amsterdam’s citizens and showed 
that 38 percent of respondents were willing to take part in all possible forms of collaborative 
consumption and 84.1 percent were willing to take part in at least one form. PIPAME (2015) 
reported the findings of a survey conducted in 2009, indicating that, at that time, 89 percent 
of the respondents had engaged at least once in collaborative consumption. Nielsen (2015) 
focused on ride services and renting in Denmark and found that by mid-2015, 3.1 percent of 
internet users let out via digital platforms and 8.7 percent had rented from Airbnb and similar 
platforms abroad, while 4.4 percent had done so in Denmark. Uber was used by 2.8 percent of 
internet users in Nielsen (2015). 
As for empirical research3 on the microstructure of specific marketplaces, most studies 
focus on the models of Airbnb and Uber: 
Fradkin (2014) reports that Airbnb’s potential guests typically view only a subset of poten-
tial matches in the market and more than 40 percent of listings remain vacant for some dates; 
hosts reject guests’ proposals to transact 49 percent of the time, causing the potential guests 
to leave the market although there are potentially good matches remaining; and without 
search frictions (if guests had all information and knew which hosts were willing to transact 
with them), there would be 102 percent more matches, and revenue per searcher would be 
$117 higher. Zervas et al (2014) used data obtained from both Airbnb and the hotel industry 
in the Austin (Texas) area. They found that Airbnb’s impact on the hotel market amounted to 
an 8 percent to 10 percent reduction in revenues, and that this impact was non-uniformly dis-
tributed, with lower-priced hotels, and hotels not catering to business travel being the most 
affected segments. Zervas et al (2014) also found that affected hotels responded by reducing 
prices, an impact that benefits all consumers. 
Farronato and Fradkin (2015) found that the market expansion and business stealing 
effects of Airbnb differ by location, and attributed the differences to supply constraints – legal 
and geographic – relative to the level of demand. According to their model, hotels and peer-
to-peer suppliers differ in their fixed and marginal costs, with hotels having higher fixed costs 
and peer-to-peer suppliers having higher marginal costs. The authors concluded that efficient 
market structure depends on the level and variability of demand, and quantified the welfare 
gains from peer-to-peer entry in the accommodation industry.
A statistical analysis of Airbnb data (combining pictures of all New York City landlords on 
Airbnb with their rental prices and information about the quality of the rentals) found what 
3 Codagnone and Martens (2016) provide a nice review of the empirical research findings.
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can be seen as indirect evidence of racial discrimination (Edelman and Luca, 2014). The main 
finding was that, controlling for other relevant covariates, non-black hosts charge approxi-
mately 12 percent more than black hosts for equivalent rentals. These effects are robust when 
controlling for all information visible in the Airbnb marketplace. These findings highlight the 
existence of discrimination in online marketplaces as a significant unintended consequence 
of a seemingly routine mechanism for building trust.
Bond (2015) analysed Uber’s impact in San Francisco, the District of Columbia and New 
York, using extensive statistics on the taxi industry in the three areas pre- and post-Uber. The 
descriptive data suggests that Uber has had a negative impact on both the taxi industry’s 
revenues and the values of taxi licenses. Wallsten (2015) uses Google Trends data as a proxy 
to measure the demand for Uber services and administrative records of taxi complaints filed 
by consumers in New York and Chicago. He shows that increased use of Uber correlates with 
fewer complaints. He finds that competition from Uber has led traditional taxi drivers to 
improve customer service. However, because of data limitations, it is difficult to estimate the 
exact magnitude of this spillover effect. Greenwood and Wattal (2015), taking advantage of 
the natural experiment created by the staggered entrance of Uber into different Californian 
cities between 2009 and 2013, concluded that Uber services contributed to a reduction in 
alcohol-related motor vehicle homicides. 
Cullen and Farronato (2015) found that TaskRabbit’s auction mechanisms (before a recent 
change of model) were inefficient because they did not vary much with market conditions, 
and suggested that a simpler mechanism may be preferable. This spot market clears thanks 
to a high elasticity of supply: in periods when demand doubles, sellers work almost twice as 
hard, prices hardly increase and the probability of requested tasks being matched falls only 
slightly. Horton (2014) found similar results for the oDesk market for professional services.
Fraiberger and Sundararajan (2015) calibrated data from the traditional US car market and 
from just one online peer-to-peer rental service (Getaround). They showed that peer-to-peer 
rental markets change the allocation of goods significantly and that below-median income 
consumers enjoy a disproportionate fraction of the resulting welfare gains through broader 
inclusion, higher quality rental-based consumption, and new ownership facilitated by rental 
supply revenues. Schor et al (2014), in their qualitative empirical study based on fieldwork at 
four sites, analysed how social class and other forms of inequality have an impact within this 
type of economic arrangement. They found considerable evidence of discriminatory practices 
and the deployment of cultural capital (ie some individuals did not share with others who 
made grammatical errors in text exchanged online). This exercise of class power undermines 
the ability to forge relationships of exchange, and reduces the volume of trades. It creates 
an inconsistency between actual practice and the widely articulated goals of openness and 
equality.
3 Provision of services through 
collaborative platforms 
KEY FINDINGS
• The classification of services provided through collaborative platforms requires case-by-
case analysis;
• There are three main criteria for classifying the services provided as professional: frequen-
cy of provision, a profit-seeking motive and remuneration;
• These three criteria can be used score platforms. By applying a threshold, we can differen-
tiate between professio nal and non-professional services in peer-to-peer markets;
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• Empirical evidence confirms the profit-seeking motive in sectors in which collaborative 
economy platforms are present;
• Further relevant empirical research with a focus on European markets should be 
encouraged. 
3.1 Professional versus non-professional services  
Collaborative economy platforms enable the provision of services by individuals and SMEs. 
EU consumer and marketing legislation provides the framework for transactions so that 
all involved parties are protected. For professional services, there are additional regulatory 
requirements on service providers, including market access, tax and safety regulations, which 
increase the operating costs of professional providers (and consequently the cost of the 
transaction)4. However, EU legislation does not establish at what point an individual becomes 
a professional service provider in the collaborative economy. EU countries apply differ-
ent criteria to differentiate between professional services and peer-to-peer services. Some 
member states define professional services as services provided for remuneration compared 
to peer-to-peer services that seek to cover the costs incurred by the services provider. Other 
member states differentiate using thresholds. These thresholds are often developed on a 
sector-specific basis, taking into account the level of income generated or the regularity with 
which the service is provided. Below these thresholds, service providers are usually subject to 
less restrictive requirements. 
The collaborative economy blurs the line between professional and non-professional 
services, especially in the business models that belong to the northwest quadrant of Figure 1. 
Given the great variety of business models, classification of services as professional must be 
done on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, by looking at the particular characteristics of the 
providers of services in collaborative economy models some general criteria5 to define profes-
sional services can be identified:
• Frequency of service: if the service is provided on a regular basis, it is more likely to fall 
into the professional category;
• Reason for service provision: if the main purpose of the provision of the service is to earn 
income, then the provider is more likely to be seen as a professional;
• Income level: the higher is the income from provision of the service, the more likely the 
service will be classified as professional. 
For example, the BlaBlaCar platform is used for long-distance trips that on average (per 
provider) are not as frequent as the trips made by urban ride-sharing platform drivers (such 
as Uber and Lyft drivers). A service provider that uses the BlaBlaCar platform is more likely 
to want to recover the cost of a trip, rather than generate income. BlaBlaCar drivers would 
possibly take long-distance trips for personal reasons even if they do not share their car. For 
Uber and Lyft, this is not the case, because the passengers determine the exact route and time 
of the ride. 
The three criteria should not be examined in isolation. It is necessary to define a method 
of calculating a score based on these three criteria and set a threshold above which the 
service can be classified as professional. Since each EU country uses different criteria and 
thresholds to define professional services, EU-wide coordination is needed to avoid major 
cross-border discrepancies. In this respect, the collaborative economy is an opportunity for 
4 According to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC): a trader is a person “acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business, craft or profession”; and a consumer is a person acting “outside his trade, business, 
craft or profession”.
5 The European Commission, in its European agenda for the collaborative economy (see COM (2016) 356) correctly 
identifies these criteria as important for the definition of professional services.
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better collaboration between member states, which is vital for the fulfilment of the goals of 
the digital single market.
It is important to identify the services that should be classified as professional in order to 
apply the appropriate consumer protection framework in collaborative economy transac-
tions. Profit-seeking motives seem to be well justified from the available empirical evidence. 
The proportion of full-time providers is significant. This suggests that some individuals con-
sider their involvement with collaborative platforms to be the primary source of their income. 
However, further analysis and evidence is needed to reach a conclusion about the share of 
activities in the collaborative economy that can be classified as professional. 
Jobs associated with the collaborative economy account for less than 50 percent of house-
hold income for 58.5 percent of respondents to the RFS 1099 Economy Workforce Report 
(2015), and less than 25 percent of household income for almost two-fifths of respondents. 
Moreover, according to a 2015 survey of 3000 Americans commissioned by Burston-Mars-
teller, the Aspen Institute and TIME, 44 percent of the population have used collaborative 
platforms. Corrected for internet usage and demographics, the data shows that almost all of 
the people involved in the collaborative economy have used the services (42 percent) of a col-
laborative platform and about half have worked (22 percent) through a collaborative platform. 
Figure 2 shows the share of the US population that participates in the collaborative econ-
omy. The providers primarily offered services such as home repair and moving (11 percent), 
ride sharing (10 percent), accommodation (9 percent), and to a lesser extent food delivery 
(7 percent) and car rental/sharing (6 percent). The services provided are quite evenly spread 
across different types of services identified in the survey. Demand meanwhile is more biased 
towards ride sharing, accommodation (19 percent) and services (17 percent). Providers and 
users have, on average, offered/used services from two types of platform.
Figure 2: US population share that participates in collaborative economy
Source: Burston-Marsteller, the Aspen Institute and TIME (2015).
Figure 3 on the next page shows the share of household income in the US derived from the 
collaborative economy: 39 percent of households earn less than 25 percent of their income 
from the collaborative economy, while 29 percent of households rely heavily on income from 
collaborative economy platforms.
Figure 4 on the next page shows that 36 percent of casual workers (the ones who earn less 
than 40 percent of their monthly income) and 33 percent of workers who earn more than 40 
percent of their monthly income in the collaborative economy, consider the collaborative 
economy to be the primary source of their income. Smaller percentages of service providers 
are attracted primarily because of the flexibility of work in collaborative economy business 
models.
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Figure 3: Percentage of household income in the US from the collaborative 
economy
Source: RFS 1099 Report, Bloomberg. 
Figure 4: Reasons for joining collaborative economy platforms, casual workers 
(left panel) and regular workers (right panel)
Source: Burston-Marsteller, the Aspen Institute and TIME (2015).
A further more comprehensive empirical analysis with a European focus could provide 
many useful insights, especially in relation to the frequency of provided services and 
remuneration.
4 Regulatory challenges and consumer 
protection
KEY FINDINGS
• Regulation should not only target collaborative platforms, but should also adjust the 
regulatory framework in the markets of their traditional competitors in order to encourage 
innovation and their further adoption of information technologies;
• Application of regulations at the local, national and EU level should be coordinated to 
maximise the benefits from the operation of such platforms;
• Regulatory certainty should underpin the growth of European platforms, so they can close 
the gap with North America and Asia;
• Collaborative platforms have extensive access to information related to their users and 
market conditions. They can thus substantially contribute to the protection of their users. 
Their collaboration with authorities is essential to guarantee high protection standards; 
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• We make nine recommendations on how to improve and protect users of collaborative 
platforms.
4.1 Regulatory concerns and approach                 
Despite the efficiencies and benefits associated with the collaborative economy, there are 
concerns about how it can be properly regulated. Goudin (2016), for example, concluded 
that the current regulatory framework is not appropriate, suggesting that a new framework is 
needed. In addition, the difference in regulatory regimes for online and offline services can 
lead in some cases to situations of unfair market competition. An important question is there-
fore: how can we restore a level playing field? 
To answer this question we should look at how to regulate collaborative economy plat-
forms and also to how to adjust the existing regulatory framework that applies to offline 
services to take account of the arrival of collaborative efficient competitors. The entry of 
digital firms into traditional markets can have positive spillover effects for the ‘traditional’ 
incumbents6. The entry of collaborative platforms should increase competition. Such com-
petitive pressure can stimulate investment in innovation by offline firms in order to protect 
their market positions. Regulation in the main sectors of collaborative activity should also be 
aimed at promoting the greater adoption of information technologies by offline firms so that 
they can compete more efficiently with their collaborative competitors. In this way, additional 
benefits will accrue to consumers as a result of increased competition7. For example, strict 
price regulation in the taxi industry (which to some extent was introduced for transparency 
reasons and passenger protection) has been overtaken by the liberalisation of the market with 
the entry of Uber, Lyft and other collaborative ride-sharing firms. Digital information on the 
terms and conditions of ride services provides transparency over the transaction even if the 
price of the ride is not fixed. Since fixed prices will not be necessary for transparency, taxis 
will not feel constrained by the regulatory framework and will be able to reduce their prices 
and compete more effectively with collaborative platforms (as hotels did in response to the 
entry and operation of Airbnb; see Zervas et al, 2014).
In specific sectors in which collaborative platforms facilitate (professional) services that 
are close substitutes (from the perspective of consumers) for those offered by traditional 
firms, the additional regulatory costs faced by traditional firms might prevent them from 
competing with digital firms. In such cases, the establishment of a level playing field should 
not lead to increased regulatory costs for platforms, which would likely be passed through 
to consumers. The main objective should be the protection of consumers and not protection 
against competition.         
Legal certainty and regulatory clarity are also required to incentivise further investment 
in efficient information technologies. The current uncertainty over the status of collaborative 
economy platforms, the legal disputes before national and European courts, and decisions to 
restrict the operations of platforms at local/city level, have created an environment in which 
it is difficult to attract new investment in Europe. Regulatory authorities should move quickly 
to define the framework of the operation of such platforms, in order to restore investors’ con-
fidence. In any case, restricting the operation of particular business models will have a greater 
impact on newer and smaller European platforms, rather than on established American plat-
forms that have reached a scale sufficient to absorb such regulatory shocks. For example, the 
decision of the Berlin city court to ban short-term rentals had a greater impact on 9Flats than 
Airbnb, because Berlin’s accommodation market is much more important for the operation of 
the former (given its smaller scale) than the latter.  
If we compare the online platforms created in Europe to those founded in North America 
6 As Wallsten (2015) predicts. See relevant discussion in section 2.3.
7 I believe that the European Commission ought to have covered this point in the European agenda for the collabo-
rative economy (COM (2016) 356).
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and Asia, we see that Europe is far behind both in terms of number of platforms and their 
market capitalisation (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Online platforms by region
Source: Evans and Gawer (2016).
Another key question is whether or not regulatory intervention should take place at EU 
level or at local level. Collaborative platforms mainly have an impact on local economies. It 
therefore makes sense to emphasise local-level regulation that responds to the characteristics 
of different localities. However, because collaborative platforms have the tendency to expand 
to multiple countries, a European approach is also necessary to make sure that any local 
rules are in line with the basic principles of the digital single market and agenda. The balance 
between EU-wide and local regulation should be stable, while meeting the needs of each 
region. 
Other current regulatory discussions around the collaborative economy include:
1. Employment: Should providers of services through collaborative platforms be considered 
employees or independent contractors? The great variety of business models implies that 
a case-by-case approach should be adopted. If the platform controls the provision of the 
service and sets the terms and conditions, it would suggest an employment relationship. 
However, flexibility on the part of the provider is a common characteristic of the main 
business models: the provider can choose when and for how long to work. The relation-
ship between the platform and the provider is usually non-exclusive allowing providers to 
offer services via other platforms or in other ways. According to the EU Court of Justice8, 
the essential features of an employment relationship are:
i. For a certain period, a person performs services for and under the direction of another 
person.
ii. In return, he/she receives remuneration.
This definition does not fully match with the flexibility providers have in relation to 
collaborative economy platforms. This suggests that in cases in which the platform con-
trols the provision of the service, a new employment relationship is needed that provides 
sufficient protection for workers, but does not abolish the flexibility, which in combina-
tion with efficient information-matching technologies can generate additional benefits for 
service providers. Note, however that if providers are classified as employees, the platform 
will incur additional costs which are likely to be passed on to end users (providers and 
consumers).
2. Taxation: While there is substantive law on taxing corporate revenue, enforcement might 
be difficult because some platforms can choose the most favourable regulatory regime 
for them. Tax issues should be addressed both at local level through cooperation between 
8 See also European Commission (2010).
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authorities, and at international level by removing opportunities for tax evasion. 
3. Data and privacy regulation: Platforms rely extensively on user data and algorithms to 
match buyers and sellers, set prices and monitor behaviour. The extensive data collection 
and the use of personalised algorithms raise challenging regulatory issues and questions. 
For instance, what rights should consumers have to limit the way these businesses use 
their data? Should it be possible to share or sell individual feedback ratings or purchase 
histories? If a worker performs poorly, or a consumer gets bad feedback when using a 
particular service, should they be able to expect a fresh start with another one? According 
to Tucker (2015) a worker whose poor feedback follows her to her next job might suffer 
economic harm, but even if she does not, she may suffer an inherent – and difficult to 
quantify – cost from the loss of privacy.
4. Optimal timing for regulatory action9: Digital platforms can grow and evolve extremely 
quickly if they succeed. One difficulty in trying to regulate rapidly growing and evolving 
businesses is that regulations cannot easily be changed or withdrawn. Rules that looked 
sensible at the time they were imposed might later appear outdated or misguided. How-
ever, it should be taken into account that regulatory measures can have a major impact 
on the potential development of platforms. More important than the timing of regulatory 
intervention is the clarity of the rules that allow platforms to design their growth path with 
certainty.
4.2 Protection of users: nine tentative recommendations
The following nine priorities (in random order) for protection of consumers may be applica-
ble to different degrees to different platforms, depending on their business models, the types 
of services they provide and the market characteristics:
• Safety of service: Platforms and authorities should ensure that providers of (especial-
ly professional) services have been through the appropriate training and inspection pro-
cesses and have the required qualifications to provide the service to consumers in a safe 
way. Professional service providers should be required to comply with the same standards 
as the ‘traditional’ firms that operate in the same market.
• Transparency of collection and processing of personal data: Platforms 
collect personal data from their users to help improve the efficiency of their algorithms. 
In some cases, collected data contains sensitive information, such as locations of users at 
various times or credit card details. Platforms should inform their users through clear and 
easy to read notifications about the data they collect and the way they process it. Users 
should always give their explicit consent.
• Clear liability rules: Liability rules should be clear in advance of any transaction, 
and all parties should be properly notified and insured. Platforms can be exposed to 
liabilities when they define the terms and conditions while also controlling the provided 
service. 
• Reliability of reputation mechanisms: The ability to check and evaluate service 
provider profiles, and to read reviews about the quality of the service, is important and 
can help maximise the benefits of an efficient transaction by removing information asym-
metries. It is important that these mechanisms should be designed in an unbiased way 
so that they show the true preferences and judgments of users. Potential concerns over 
how unbiased these mechanisms are include the fact that reviewers might be reluctant 
to provide negative ratings (because, for example, they are afraid of starting a bad ratings 
‘war’ and hurting their reputation). In markets in which the values of individual trans-
actions are higher, or where personal safety is a concern, reputation mechanisms have 
become increasingly sophisticated. Prosper, for example, collects and posts credit bureau 
9 See Einav et al (2015).
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information about potential borrowers. Airbnb verifies the true identities of buyers and 
sellers. Two-sided reviews also play an important role. For instance, Uber uses custom-
er reviews to screen out problematic drivers, and shows drivers the ratings of potential 
customers, so that customers who behave badly might have a harder time finding a ride 
in the future. Of course, heavy reliance on feedback scores raises the concern that users 
will seek to manipulate these scores. Mayzlin et al (2015) argue that on review platforms 
such as TripAdvisor or Yelp, where anyone can post a review, manipulation is pervasive. 
Platforms should design carefully their review and evaluation mechanisms so that reports 
are truthful and manipulation limited.
• Prevention of fraud: As payments are made online, there is always the risk of fraud. 
Ranchordas (2015), for example, reported numerous protests about scams on websites in 
the context of collaborative economy transactions. Platforms should design their payment 
process to minimise the risk of fraud. Moreover, it is important for consumers to be able to 
easily file complaints and obtain quick and fair complaint resolution.
• Assurance of non-discriminatory provision of services: Platforms should en-
courage general, clear and transparent rules against any form of discrimination (including 
racial minorities, low-income users and low-income regions), which should be respected 
by all participants. The lack of relevant regulation of the collaborative economy (Edelman 
and Geradin, 2015) should not leave an open window for such practices. Discriminatory 
practices have been empirically observed and should be properly addressed (see section 
2.3).
• Closer collaboration with local authorities: The close collaboration of 
platforms with local authorities is essential for the fair allocation of the generated benefits 
within local communities, and for the creation of smart cities based on collaborative 
consumption. Discussions and bilateral agreements on a series of issues, such as city tax-
ation, local employment, investment in infrastructure and efficient ways to share assets, 
can improve living standards and increase the value of participation in the collaborative 
economy. 
• Encouragement of digital users’ associations: Platforms and information 
technologies can facilitate interactions between users and can help them to form associ-
ations that represent their interests. This is particularly important in large and successful 
business models with many users, in which platforms retain the right to control (at least 
partly) the terms and conditions of the provision of the service. Such interaction among 
users can improve their collective bargaining position and help platforms make opera-
tional decisions that benefit to a greater extent their users. This should be encouraged.
• Encouragement of evidence-based economic analysis: While there are now 
multiple collaborative business models that have arisen in many sectors, there is only a 
limited number of empirical studies dealing with the impact of collaborative economy 
platforms. A major reason for this is the lack of available data on the operation of these 
platforms. In addition, some of the studies that have been done with direct access to 
platforms’ data have been commissioned by the platforms. Research by academic and 
policy institutions should be encouraged. As access to data is needed, platforms could 
agree to give researchers access to parts of their datasets (to the extent that they do not 
compromise their business activities). Assessing the exact impact of platforms is of vital 
importance for the design of the correct policies.
15 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚5 | 2017
5 Conclusions
The arrival of the collaborative economy could bring many benefits for consumers and the 
economy as a whole. Through their matching algorithms, online platforms improve the effi-
ciency of transactions, leading to increased trade among peers in underutilised assets.
Regulation to address concerns generated by the operation of collaborative platforms 
should be adopted on a case-by-case basis. However, general criteria for classifying services 
into professional and non-professional categories can be adopted. It would be helpful if there 
was EU-wide agreement on the classification.   
The literature on the topic shows that we are far from finding the answers to some of the 
fundamental questions about the collaborative economy. The available research is too limited 
to give us a comprehensive and coherent picture. As collaborative platforms are expected to 
make further inroads into markets, it is essential to encourage further research that focuses 
on the impact of these platforms on the economy, the associated regulatory concerns and 
the best way to address them, and how incentives can be provided for more investment in 
information technologies to increase further the positive impact of collaborative platforms on 
the economy.    
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